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Below is the complete text of
the Colin Powell's presentation on case for war on Iraq. |
Full Text of Colin Powell Presentation to United Nations
United Nations
February 5, 2003
Thank you,
Mr. President.
Mr President, Mr Secretary General, distinguished
colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for
the special effort that each of you made to be here today.
This is important day for us all as we review the situation
with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN
security council resolution 1441.
Last November 8, this council passed resolution 1441 by a
unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm
Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been
found guilty of material breach of its obligations, stretching
back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.
Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but
a regime this council has repeatedly convicted over the years.
Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to
come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No
council member present in voting on that day had any allusions
about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious
consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.
And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to
cooperate with returning inspectors from Unmovic and IAEA.
We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the
inspectors to do their job.
This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm
and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out
of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors;
they are not detectives.
I asked for this session today for two purposes: First, to
support the core assessments made by Dr Blix and Dr El-Baradei.
As Dr Blix reported to this council on January 27: "Iraq
appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even
today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it."
And as Dr El-Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of
December 7: "Did not provide any new information relevant to
certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."
My second purpose today is to provide you with additional
information, to share with you what the United States knows
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq's
involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of
resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.
I might add at this point that we are providing all
relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them
to do their work.
The material I will present to you comes from a variety of
sources. Some are U.S. sources. And some are those of other
countries.
Some of the sources are technical, such as intercepted
telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other
sources are people who have risked their lives to let the
world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can
share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned
over the years, is deeply troubling.
What you will see is an accumulation of facts and
disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts on Iraqis' behavior
- Iraq's behavior demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his
regime have made no effort - no effort - to disarm as required
by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's
behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are
concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass
destruction.
Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about
to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It
takes place on November 26 of last year, on the day before
United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq.
The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel
and a brigadier general, from Iraq's elite military unit, the
Republican Guard.
(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE) Speaking in Arabic.
(END AUDIO TAPE) POWELL: Let me pause and review some of
the key elements of this conversation that you just heard
between these two officers.
First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohamed
ElBaradei, is coming, and they know what he's coming for, and
they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to look for
things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to
cooperate with him and not hide things.
But they're worried. "We have this modified vehicle. What
do we say if one of them sees it?" What is their concern?
Their concern is that it's something they should not have,
something that should not be seen.
The general is incredulous: "You didn't get a modified. You
don't have one of those, do you?" "I have one." "Which, from
where?" "From the workshop, from the al-Kindi company?"
"What?" "From al-Kindi." "I'll come to see you in the morning.
I'm worried. You all have something left." "We evacuated
everything. We don't have anything left." Note what he says:
"We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't
line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the
inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around
when the inspectors showed up.
"I will come to you tomorrow." The al-Kindi company: This
is a company that is well known to have been involved in
prohibited weapons systems activity.
Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the
inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16. On
January 20, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it
would search for more. You will now hear an officer from
Republican Guard headquarters issuing an instruction to an
officer in the field. Their conversation took place just last
week on January 30.
(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE) Speaking in Arabic.
(END AUDIO TAPE) POWELL: Let me pause again and review the
elements of this message.
"They're inspecting the ammunition you have, yes." "Yes."
"For the possibility there are forbidden ammo." "For the
possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?" "Yes." "And we
sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of the areas,
the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is
nothing there." Remember the first message, evacuated.
This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving
things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing
behind.
If you go a little further into this message, and you see
the specific instructions from headquarters: "After you have
carried out what is contained in this message, destroy the
message because I don't want anyone to see this message." "OK,
OK." Why? Why?
This message would have verified to the inspectors that
they have been trying to turn over things. They were looking
for things. But they don't want that message seen, because
they were trying to clean up the area to leave no evidence
behind of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. And
they can claim that nothing was there. And the inspectors can
look all they want, and they will find nothing.
This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one
or two isolated events, quite the contrary. This is part and
parcel of a policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12
years, a policy set at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime.
We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called quote, "a
higher committee for monitoring the inspections teams,"
unquote. Think about that. Iraq has a high-level committee to
monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's
disarmament.
Not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy
on them and keep them from doing their jobs.
The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is
headed by Iraq's vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan. Its
members include Saddam Hussein's son Qusay.
This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir al-Saadi,
an adviser to Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately
familiar to you, General Saadi has been the Iraqi regime's
primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It
was General Saadi who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was
prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Quite
the contrary, Saadi's job is not to cooperate, it is to
deceive; not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not
to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they
learn nothing.
We have learned a lot about the work of this special
committee. We learned that just prior to the return of
inspectors last November the regime had decided to resume what
we heard called, quote, "the old game of cat and mouse,"
unquote.
For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration
that Iraq submitted to this council on December 7. Iraq never
had any intention of complying with this council's mandate.
Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration, overwhelm us
and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about
Iraq's permitted weapons so that we would not have time to
pursue Iraq's prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us,
in this room, to give those us on this council the false
impression that the inspection process was working.
You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page
declaration, rich in volume, but poor in information and
practically devoid of new evidence.
Could any member of this council honestly rise in defense
of this false declaration? Everything we have seen and heard
indicates that, instead of cooperating actively with the
inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam
Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to
ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing.
My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by
sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're
giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid
intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from
human sources.
Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as
well as to Saddam Hussein's own office, to hide all
correspondence with the Organization of Military
Industrialization.
This is the organization that oversees Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction activities. Make sure there are no documents
left which could connect you to the OMI.
We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of
all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace
complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of
the ruling Baath Party and scientists have hidden prohibited
items in their homes. Other key files from military and
scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are
being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence
agents to avoid detection.
Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors
recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When
they searched the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they
uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here
being brought out of the home and placed in U.N. hands. Some
of the material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear
program.
Tell me, answer me, are the inspectors to search the house
of every government official, every Baath Party member and
every scientist in the country to find the truth, to get the
information they need, to satisfy the demands of our council?
Our sources tell us that, in some cases, the hard drives of
computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took
the hard drives? Where did they go? What's being hidden? Why?
There's only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to
keep from the inspectors.
Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving,
not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass
destruction to keep them from being found by inspectors.
While we were here in this council chamber debating
Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that
a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket
launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to
various locations, distributing them to various locations in
western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been
hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved
every one to four weeks to escape detection.
We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned
materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction facilities.
Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a
couple. The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes
hard for the average person to interpret, hard for me. The
painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years
and years of experience, pouring for hours and hours over
light tables. But as I show you these images, I will try to
capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate to our
imagery specialists.
Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munition
facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called
Taji (ph). This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We
know that this one has housed chemical munitions. In fact,
this is where the Iraqis recently came up with the additional
four chemical weapon shells.
Here, you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red
outlines. The four that are in red squares represent active
chemical munitions bunkers.
How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a
closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a
close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows
indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are
storing chemical munitions. The arrow at the top that says
security points to a facility that is the signature item for
this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards
and special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come
out of the bunker.
The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a
decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.
This is characteristic of those four bunkers. The special
security facility and the decontamination vehicle will be in
the area, if not at any one of them or one of the other, it is
moving around those four, and it moves as it needed to move,
as people are working in the different bunkers.
Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking
at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are
gone, the tents are gone, it's been cleaned up, and it was
done on the 22nd of December, as the U.N. inspection team is
arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in
the lower portion of the picture on the right.
The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They
found nothing.
This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that
Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at
Taji (ph). As it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq
today is actively using its considerable intelligence
capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our sources,
we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance by an
army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly
attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and
electronics.
I would call my colleagues attention to the fine paper that
United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in
exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.
In this next example, you will see the type of concealment
activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of
inspections. Indeed, in November 2002, just when the
inspections were about to resume this type of activity spiked.
Here are three examples.
At this ballistic missile site, on November 10, we saw a
cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components. At
this biological weapons related facility, on November 25, just
two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan
appeared, something we almost never see at this facility, and
we monitor it carefully and regularly.
At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before
inspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared along with
the truck-mounted crane to move missiles. We saw this kind of
house cleaning at close to 30 sites.
Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment
that I've just highlighted disappear and the site returns to
patterns of normalcy. We don't know precisely what Iraq was
moving, but the inspectors already knew about these sites, so
Iraq knew that they would be coming.
We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move
equipment of this nature before inspections if they were
anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have? Remember
the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about the need
to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraq
take all of this equipment? Why wasn't it presented to the
inspectors? Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2
reconnaissance flights that would give the inspectors a better
sense of what's being moved before, during and after
inspectors.
This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is in
direct, specific violation of operative paragraph seven of our
Resolution 1441.
Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to
conceal weapons, they're also trying to hide people. You know
the basic facts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to
allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to
all officials and other persons as required by Resolution
1441.
The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the
presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi
organization charged with facilitating inspections announced,
announced publicly and announced ominously that, quote,
"Nobody is ready to leave Iraq to be interviewed." Iraqi Vice
President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting
espionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with U.N.
inspectors was committing treason.
Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a
comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons
of mass destruction programs. Iraq's list was out of date and
contained only about 500 names, despite the fact that UNSCOM
had earlier put together a list of about 3,500 names.
Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have
told us.
Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to
prevent interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all
Iraqi scientists warned of the serious consequences that they
and their families would face if they revealed any sensitive
information to the inspectors. They were forced to sign
documents acknowledging that divulging information is
punishable by death.
Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not
to agree to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed
outside Iraq would be treated as a spy. This violates 1441.
In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi
experts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the
special security organization to receive counterintelligence
training. The training focused on evasion methods,
interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead
inspectors.
Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are
facts, corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of
the intelligence services of other countries.
For example, in mid-December weapons experts at one
facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were
to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done
there.
On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a
false death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent
into hiding.
In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was
related to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been
ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors.
Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not engaged in
elicit weapons projects were to replace the workers who'd been
sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under house
arrest, not in their own houses, but as a group at one of
Saddam Hussein's guest houses. It goes on and on and on.
As the examples I have just presented show, the information
and intelligence we have gathered point to an active and
systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key
materials and people from the inspectors in direct violation
of Resolution 1441. The pattern is not just one of reluctant
cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we
see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful
inspection work.
My colleagues, operative paragraph four of U.N. Resolution
1441, which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states
that false statements and omissions in the declaration and a
failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully
in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute -
the facts speak for themselves - shall constitute a further
material breach of its obligation.
We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test - to give
Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest declaration and
would they early on indicate a willingness to cooperate with
the inspectors? It was designed to be an early test.
They failed that test. By this standard, the standard of
this operative paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in
further material breach of its obligations. I believe this
conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable.
Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious
consequences called for in U.N. Resolution 1441. And this body
places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to
continue to defy its will without responding effectively and
immediately.
The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to
give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But
how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's
noncompliance before we, as a council, we, as the United
Nations, say: "Enough. Enough." The gravity of this moment is
matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those
deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real and
present dangers to the region and to the world.
First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here
about biological weapons. By way of introduction and history,
I think there are just three quick points I need to make.
First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long and
frustrating years to pry - to pry - an admission out of Iraq
that it had biological weapons.
Second, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in
1995, the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry
anthrax, a little bit about this amount - this is just about
the amount of a teaspoon - less than a teaspoon full of dry
anthrax in an envelope shutdown the United States Senate in
the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to
undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal
workers just from an amount just about this quantity that was
inside of an envelope.
Iraq declared 8,500 liters of anthrax, but UNSCOM estimates
that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If
concentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough
to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons.
And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one
teaspoon-full of this deadly material.
And that is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have
never accounted for all of the biological weapons they
admitted they had and we know they had. They have never
accounted for all the organic material used to make them. And
they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with
these agents such as there are 400 bombs. This is evidence,
not conjecture. This is true. This is all well-documented.
Dr. Blix told this council that Iraq has provided little
evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing
evidence of its destruction. It should come as no shock then,
that since Saddam Hussein forced out the last inspectors in
1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq
is continuing to make these weapons.
One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the
thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons
is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make
biological agents.
Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share
with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have
firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on
wheels and on rails.
The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed
to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they
can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the
entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years
prior to the Gulf War.
Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the
mid-1990s, U.N. inspectors at the time only had vague hints of
such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000.
The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer
who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was
present during biological agent production runs. He was also
at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve
technicians died from exposure to biological agents.
He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting,
the biological weapons agent production always began on
Thursdays at midnight because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not
inspect on the Muslim Holy Day, Thursday night through Friday.
He added that this was important because the units could not
be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to
be completed by Friday evening before the inspectors might
arrive again.
This defector is currently hiding in another country with
the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he
finds him. His eyewitness account of these mobile production
facilities has been corroborated by other sources.
A second source, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to
know the details of the program, confirmed the existence of
transportable facilities moving on trailers.
A third source, also in a position to know, reported in
summer 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile production
systems mounted on road trailer units and on rail cars.
Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi major, who defected,
confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research
laboratories, in addition to the production facilities I
mentioned earlier.
We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these
mobile facilities. Here you see both truck and rail
car-mounted mobile factories. The description our sources gave
us of the technical features required by such facilities are
highly detailed and extremely accurate. As these drawings
based on their description show, we know what the fermenters
look like, we know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and
other parts look like. We know how they fit together. We know
how they work. And we know a great deal about the platforms on
which they are mounted.
As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed
easily, either by moving ordinary-looking trucks and rail cars
along Iraq's thousands of miles of highway or track, or by
parking them in a garage or warehouse or somewhere in Iraq's
extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers.
We know that Iraq has at lest seven of these mobile
biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at
least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile
production facilities are very few, perhaps 18 trucks that we
know of-there may be more-but perhaps 18 that we know of. Just
imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and
thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single
day.
It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was
making biological agents. How long do you think it will take
the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without
Iraq coming forward, as they are supposed to, with the
information about these kinds of capabilities? Ladies and
gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example,
they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they
can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to
kill thousands upon thousands of people. And dry agent of this
type is the most lethal form for human beings.
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By 1998, UN
experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying
techniques for their biological weapons programmes. Now,
Iraq has incorporated this drying expertise into these
mobile production facilities.
We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has
successfully weaponised not only anthrax, but also other
biological agents, including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin
and ricin.
But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam
Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents
causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus,
tetanus, cholera, camelpox and hemorrhagic fever, and he
also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox.
The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disburse
lethal biological agents, widely and discriminately into
the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a
programme to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets.
This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by Unscom some
years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the
spray coming from beneath the Mirage; that is 2,000 litres
of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying.
In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Sali Abdul
Latif (ph), told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray
tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted
into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or a UAV. UAVs outfitted
with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching
a terrorist attack using biological weapons.
Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks. But to
this day, it has provided no credible evidence that they
were destroyed, evidence that was required by the
international community.
There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has
biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce
more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these
lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive
death and destruction. If biological weapons seem too
terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally
chilling.
Unmovic already laid out much of this, and it is
documented for all of us to read in Unscom's 1999 report
on the subject.
Let me set the stage with three key points that all of
us need to keep in mind: First, Saddam Hussein has used
these horrific weapons on another country and on his own
people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare, no
country has had more battlefield experience with chemical
weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has
never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550
artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and
enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as
500 tons of chemical agents. If we consider just one
category of missing weaponry - 6,500 bombs from the
Iran-Iraq war - Unmovic says the amount of chemical agent
in them would be in the order of 1,000 tons. These
quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for.
Dr. Blix has quipped that, quote, "Mustard gas is not
(inaudible). You are supposed to know what you did with
it."
We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with it,
and he has not come clean with the international
community. We have evidence these weapons existed. What we
don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been
destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still
waiting for.
Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is
replete with lies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit
that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent,
VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes.
Four tons.
The admission only came out after inspectors collected
documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein
Kamal, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law. Unscom also
gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put
it into weapons for delivery.
Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponised VX.
And on January 27, Unmovic told this council that it has
information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its
VX programme.
We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its
illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its
legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances,
even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary
civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can
go on simultaneously; or, on a dime, this dual-use
infrastructure can turn from clandestine to commercial and
then back again.
These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections of
such facilities would be unlikely to turn up anything
prohibited, especially if there is any warning that the
inspections are coming. Call it ingenuous or evil genius,
but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical
weapons programmes to be inspected. It is infrastructure
with a built-in ally.
Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has
undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were
closely associated with its past programme to develop and
produce chemical weapons.
For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq
(ph) state establishment. Tariq includes facilities
designed specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons
programme and employs key figures from past programmes.
That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons
business. What about the delivery end? I'm going to show
you a small part of a chemical complex called al-Moussaid
(ph), a site that Iraq has used for at least three years
to transship chemical weapons from production facilities
out to the field.
In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual
activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are
again at this transshipment point, and we can see that
they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle
associated with biological or chemical weapons activity.
What makes this picture significant is that we have a
human source who has corroborated that movement of
chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So
it's not just the photo, and it's not an individual seeing
the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an
individual being brought together to make the case.
This photograph of the site taken two months later in
July shows not only the previous site, which is the figure
in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it,
it shows that this previous site, as well as all of the
other sites around the site, have been fully bulldozed and
graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally
removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this
site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that
would be there from years of chemical weapons activity.
To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons
programmes, Iraq procures needed items from around the
world using an extensive clandestine network. What we know
comes largely from intercepted communications and human
sources who are in a position to know the facts.
Iraq's procurement efforts include equipment that can
filter and separate micro-organisms and toxins involved in
biological weapons, equipment that can be used to
concentrate the agent, growth media that can be used to
continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin,
sterilization equipment for laboratories, glass-lined
reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive
chemical weapons agents and precursors, large amounts of
vinyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents,
and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important
mustard agent precursor.
Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can
also be used for legitimate purposes. But if that is true,
why do we have to learn about them by intercepting
communications and risking the lives of human agents? With
Iraq's well documented history on biological and chemical
weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the
doubt? I don't, and I don't think you will either after
you hear this next intercept.
Just a few weeks ago, we intercepted communications
between two commanders in Iraq's Second Republican Guard
Corps. One commander is going to be giving an instruction
to the other. You will hear as this unfolds that what he
wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to make
sure the other guy hears clearly, to the point of
repeating it so that it gets written down and completely
understood. Listen.
(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE) Speaking in foreign language.
(END AUDIO TAPE) POWELL: Let's review a few selected
items of this conversation. Two officers talking to each
other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is
misunderstood:
"Remove. Remove."
The expression, the expression, "I got it."
"Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up."
"Got it."
"Wherever it comes up."
"In the wireless instructions, in the instructions."
"Correction. No. In the wireless instructions."
"Wireless. I got it."
Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful
in making sure this is understood? And why did he focus on
wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is
concerned that somebody might be listening.
Well, somebody was.
"Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. They are
listening to us. Don't give any evidence that we have
these horrible agents." Well, we know that they do. And
this kind of conversation confirms it.
Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a
stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons
agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield
rockets.
Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable
Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than
100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times
the size of Manhattan.
Let me remind you that, of the 122 millimetre chemical
warheads, that the UN inspectors found recently, this
discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip
of the submerged iceberg. The question before us, all my
friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged
iceberg?
Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has
used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction
about using them again, against his neighbours and against
his own people.
And we have sources who tell us that he recently has
authorised his field commanders to use them. He wouldn't
be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons or
the intent to use them.
We also have sources who tell us that, since the 1980s,
Saddam's regime has been experimenting on human beings to
perfect its biological or chemical weapons.
A source said that 1,600 death row prisoners were
transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such
experiments. An eyewitness saw prisoners tied down to
beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around
the victim's mouths and autopsies performed to confirm the
effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussein's humanity -
inhumanity has no limits.
Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no
indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his
nuclear weapons programme.
On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof
that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.
To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today,
remember that, in 1991, the inspectors searched Iraq's
primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time. And
they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear
weapons programme.
But based on defector information in May of 1991,
Saddam Hussein's lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein
had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons programme that
covered several different techniques to enrich uranium,
including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas
centrifuge, and gas diffusion. We estimate that this
illicit programme cost the Iraqis several billion dollars.
Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it
had no nuclear weapons programme. If Saddam had not been
stopped, Iraq could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993,
years earlier than most worse-case assessments that had
been made before the war.
In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out
that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had
initiated a crash programme to build a crude nuclear
weapon in violation of Iraq's UN obligations.
Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three
key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a
cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise, and he has
a bomb design.
Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear
programme have been focused on acquiring the third and
last component, sufficient fissile material to produce a
nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs
to develop an ability to enrich uranium.
Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a
nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made
repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification
aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after
inspections resumed.
These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges
for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has
heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are
differences of opinion. There is controversy about what
these tubes are for.
Most US experts think they are intended to serve as
rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other
experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are
really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional
weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.
Let me tell you what is not controversial about these
tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes
in our possession agree that they can be adapted for
centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them
for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq.
I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old
Army trooper, I can tell you a couple of things: First, it
strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured
to a tolerance that far exceeds US requirements for
comparable rockets.
Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional
weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think
so.
Second, we actually have examined tubes from several
different batches that were seized clandestinely before
they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different
batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of
specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodised
coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why
would they continue refining the specifications, go to all
that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would
soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off? The high
tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We
also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is
attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing
machines; both items can be used in a gas centrifuge
programme to enrich uranium.
In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms
in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of
a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to
produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same
weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge
programme before the Gulf War. This incident linked with
the tubes is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to
reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme.
Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last
summer show that Iraq front companies sought to buy
machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge
rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a
failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.
People will continue to debate this issue, but there is
no doubt in my mind, these elicit procurement efforts show
that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in
place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons
programme, the ability to produce fissile material. He
also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts
of his nuclear programme, particularly his cadre of key
nuclear scientists.
It is noteworthy that, over the last 18 months, Saddam
Hussein has paid increasing personal attention to Iraqi's
top nuclear scientists, a group that the
governmental-controlled press calls openly, his nuclear
mujahedeen. He regularly exhorts them and praises their
progress. Progress toward what end? Long ago, the Security
Council, this council, required Iraq to halt all nuclear
activities of any kind.
Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to
deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's
ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.
First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf
War Saddam Hussein's goal was missiles that flew not just
hundreds, but thousands of kilometers. He wanted to strike
not only his neighbours, but also nations far beyond his
borders.
While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited
ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the
past decade, from sources inside Iraq, indicate that
Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen
Scud variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a
range of 650 to 900 kilometres.
We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions
that Iraq's alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samud
II (ph) and the al-Fatah (ph), violate the 150-kilometer
limit established by this council in Resolution 687. These
are prohibited systems.
Unmovic has also reported that Iraq has illegally
important 380 SA-2 (ph) rocket engines. These are likely
for use in the al-Samud II (ph). Their import was illegal
on three counts. Resolution 687 prohibited all military
shipments into Iraq. Unscom specifically prohibited use of
these engines in surface-to-surface missiles. And finally,
as we have just noted, they are for a system that exceeds
the 150-kilometer range limit.
Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as
late as December - after this council passed Resolution
1441.
What I want you to know today is that Iraq has
programmes that are intended to produce ballistic missiles
that fly 1,000 kilometers. One programme is pursuing a
liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than
1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well
as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles.
As part of this effort, another little piece of
evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is
larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic
difference in size between the test stand on the left, the
old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large
exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine
comes out. The exhaust on the right test stand is five
times longer than the one on the left. The one on the left
was used for short-range missile. The one on the right is
clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly
1,200 kilometers.
This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then,
the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put
over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what's
going on underneath the test stand.
Saddam Hussein's intentions have never changed. He is
not developing the missiles for self-defense. These are
missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to
threaten, and to deliver chemical, biological and, if we
let him, nuclear warheads.
Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.
Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more
than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV
would look like. This effort has included attempts to
modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 and with greater
success an aircraft called the L-29. However, Iraq is now
concentrating not on these airplanes, but on developing
and testing smaller UAVs, such as this.
UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and
biological weapons.
There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much
effort to developing and testing spray devices that could
be adapted for UAVs. And of the little that Saddam Hussein
told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of
these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by
intelligence we collected on June 27, last year.
According to Iraq's December 7 declaration, its UAVs
have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of
Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500
kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the race track pattern
depicted here.
Not only is this test well in excess of the 150
kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was
left out of Iraq's December 7th declaration. The UAV was
flown around and around and around in a circle. And so,
that its 80 kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers
unrefueled and on autopilot, violative of all of its
obligations under 1441.
The linkages over the past 10 years between Iraq's UAV
programme and biological and chemical warfare agents are
of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs
which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver
biological agents to its neighbours or if transported, to
other countries, including the United States.
My friends, the information I have presented to you
about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued
flaunting of its obligations under Security Council
Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a
little bit of time on. And that has to do with terrorism.
Our concern is not just about these elicit weapons.
It's the way that these elicit weapons can be connected to
terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no
compunction about using such devices against innocent
people around the world.
Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains
Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and
explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to
funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide
bombers in order to prolong the intifada. And it's no
secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved
in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the
1990s.
But what I want to bring to your attention today is the
potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the
al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic
terrorist organisations and modern methods of murder. Iraq
today harbours a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu
Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated collaborator of Osama bin
Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.
Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the
Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to
Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp.
One of his specialities and one of the specialities of
this camp is poisons. When our coalition ousted the
Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another
poison and explosive training centre camp. And this camp
is located in north-eastern Iraq.
You see a picture of this camp.
The network is teaching its operatives how to produce
ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin
works. Less than a pinch - image a pinch of salt - less
than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your
food, would cause shock followed by circulatory failure.
Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote,
there is no cure. It is fatal.
Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants
operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam
Hussein's controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the
most senior levels of the radical organisation, Ansar
al-Islam, that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 this
agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region. After we
swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of its members
accepted this safe haven. They remain there today.
Zarqawi's activities are not confined to this small
corner of north-east Iraq. He travelled to Baghdad in May
2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq
for two months while he recuperated to fight another day.
During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged
on Baghdad and established a base of operations there.
These al-Qaida affiliates, based in Baghdad, now
coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into
and throughout Iraq for his network, and they've now been
operating freely in the capital for more than eight
months.
Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaida.
These denials are simply not credible. Last year an al-Qaida
associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was, quote,
"good," that Baghdad could be transited quickly.
We know these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi
because they remain even today in regular contact with his
direct subordinates, including the poison cell plotters,
and they are involved in moving more than money and
material.
Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were
arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were
linked to associates of the Baghdad cell, and one of them
received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide.
From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his
network in the Middle East and beyond.
We, in the United States, all of us at the State
Department, and the Agency for International Development -
we all lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of
Mr. Lawrence Foley in Amman, Jordan last October, a
despicable act was committed that day. The assassination
of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the
people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell
received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder.
After the attack, an associate of the assassin left
Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for
further operations. Iraqi officials protest that they are
not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his
associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We
know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. I described them
earlier.
And now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly
security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing
Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close
associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice,
and we passed details that should have made it easy to
find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi
still remains at large to come and go.
As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens
they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi's terrorism is not
confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi and his network have
plotted terrorist actions against countries, including
France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia.
According to detainee Abuwatia (ph), who graduated from
Zarqawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasks at least
nine North African extremists from 2001 to travel to
Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.
Since last year, members of this network have been
apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our
last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web
have been arrested.
The chart you are seeing shows the network in Europe.
We know about this European network, and we know about its
links to Zarqawi, because the detainee who provided the
information about the targets also provided the names of
members of the network.
Three of those he identified by name were arrested in
France last December. In the apartments of the terrorists,
authorities found circuits for explosive devices and a
list of ingredients to make toxins.
The detainee who helped piece this together says the
plot also targeted Britain. Later evidence, again, proved
him right. When the British unearthed a cell there just
last month, one British police officer was murdered during
the disruption of the cell.
We also know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active
in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia and in Chechnya, Russia. The
plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter.
Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was to kill
Russians with toxins.
We are not surprised that Iraq is harbouring Zarqawi
and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades
long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida.
Going back to the early and mid-1990s, when bin Laden
was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that
Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al-Qaida
would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early
al-Qaida ties were forged by secret, high-level
intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi
intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida.
We know members of both organisations met repeatedly
and have met at least eight times at very senior levels
since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service
tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi
intelligence official in Khartoum, and later met the
director of the Iraqi intelligence service.
Saddam became more interested as he saw al-Qaida's
appalling attacks. A detained al-Qaida member tells us
that Saddam was more willing to assist al-Qaida after the
1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Saddam was also impressed by al-Qaida's attacks on the USS
Cole in Yemen in October 2000.
Iraqis continued to visit bin Laden in his new home in
Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's former
intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents
to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide
training to al-Qaida members on document forgery.
From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in
Pakistan played the role of liaison to the al-Qaida
organisation.
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Some
believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to
much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and
al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not
comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are
enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so
al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated
bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so
that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring
expertise on weapons of mass destruction.
And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with
other Islamist terrorist organisations is clear. Hamas,
for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999, and
Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine
Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of
sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.
Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in
acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the
story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the
story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq
provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida.
Fortunately, this operative is now detained, and he
has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he,
himself, described it.
This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for
one of al-Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan.
His information comes first-hand from his personal
involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin
Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida
leader Muhammad Atif (ph), did not believe that al-Qaida
labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture
these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go
somewhere else. They had to look outside of
Afghanistan for help. Where did they go? Where did
they look? They went to Iraq.
The support that (inaudible) describes included
Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training
for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December
2000. He says that a militant known as Abu Abdula
Al-Iraqi (ph) had been sent to Iraq several times
between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons
and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterised the
relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as
successful.
As I said at the outset, none of this should come
as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool
used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of
terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a
name. And this support continues. The nexus of poisons
and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is
old. The combination is lethal.
With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting
terrorism take the place alongside the other Iraqi
denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a
web of lies.
When we confront a regime that harbours ambitions
for regional domination, hides weapons of mass
destruction and provides haven and active support for
terrorists, we are not confronting the past, we are
confronting the present. And unless we act, we are
confronting an even more frightening future.
My friends, this has been a long and a detailed
presentation. And I thank you for your patience. But
there is one more subject that I would like to touch
on briefly. And it should be a subject of deep and
continuing concern to this council, Saddam Hussein's
violations of human rights.
Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the
facts and the patterns of behaviour that I have
identified as Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will
of this council, his contempt for the truth and most
damning of all, his utter contempt for human life.
Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against
the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th century's most
horrible atrocities; 5,000 men, women and children
died.
His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to '89
included mass summary executions, disappearances,
arbitrary jailing, ethnic cleansing and the
destruction of some 2,000 villages. He has also
conducted ethnic cleansing against the shia Iraqis and
the Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more
than a millennium. Saddam Hussein's police state
ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares to dissent.
Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any
other country, tens of thousands of people reported
missing in the past decade.
Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's
dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to all of
us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and
to his neighbours. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his
regime will stop at nothing until something stops him.
For more than 20 years, by word and by deed Saddam
Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and
the broader Middle East using the only means he knows,
intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those
who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein,
possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the
ultimate trump card, the one he must hold to fulfil
his ambition.
We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep
his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to
make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of
aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans,
given what we know of his terrorist associations and
given his determination to exact revenge on those who
oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not
some day use these weapons at a time and the place and
in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world
is in a much weaker position to respond?
The United States will not and cannot run that risk
to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in
possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few
more months or years is not an option, not in a
post-September 11th world.
My colleagues, over three months ago this council
recognised that Iraq continued to pose a threat to
international peace and security, and that Iraq had
been and remained in material breach of its
disarmament obligations. Today Iraq still poses a
threat and Iraq still remains in material breach.
Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last
opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put
itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day
when it will face serious consequences for its
continued defiance of this council.
My colleagues, we have an obligation to our
citizens, we have an obligation to this body to see
that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441
not in order to go to war, we wrote 1441 to try to
preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one
last chance. Iraq is not so far taking that one last
chance.
We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We
must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to
the citizens of the countries that are represented by
this body.
Thank you, Mr. President.
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Secretary Colin Powell
at the United Nation February 5, 2003
George Bush, President
George Bush, Governor George Bush, President George W.
Bush, George W. Bush, Geoesh 41, George Bush
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